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This paper investigates the determinants of foreign aid quality. It shows that 
design effects are a crucial component of quality. It thus establishes that donors 
have an impact on the quality of the foreign assistance they provide. The paper 
also shows both theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is 
endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and the recipient 
government. Highly capable and accountable governments accept only well-
designed projects, whereas governments with low accountability may accept poor 
quality projects either because they unable to assess the worth of the projects or 
they will benefit personally. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to show that the design of foreign aid is a key 
determinant of its quality and hence effectiveness. Indeed, aid design is shown to be as 
important as governance or economic management in determining its effectiveness. The 
paper also shows that the quality of aid is endogenous to the recipient country’s 
characteristics and the incentive system that prevails within the aid agency. In its 
theoretical part, the paper addresses the impact of the agency’s internal incentive system 
on the effort its staff members devote to the design of aid projects depending on the 
recipient country’s type. More able recipient countries receive better aid packages, 
because they have the capacity to screen and select projects conducive to development. 
However, capacity is not sufficient; governments also have to be accountable enough to 
their citizenry to be deterred from accepting bad aid packages. 
The quality of foreign aid has, until very recently, been largely overlooked. The 
literature has relied almost exclusively on the volume of aid to assess its impact. Early 
attempts to measure the quality of aid include Mosley (1985), followed by White and 
Woestman (1994), who consider the quality of aid along four dimensions (1) its volume; 
(2) its terms and conditions; (3) the extent to which it is tied; and (4) its geographical 
allocation. More recent quality measures, while following the same spirit, have become 
more sophisticated with respect to the fourth dimension. The relevant criterion for 
allocating aid has evolved from equity to selectivity. Indeed, the early literature stressed 
that aid should be given in priority to countries that are most in need, i.e. the poorest, 
where aid supposedly could have the highest impact. Trying to assess the effectiveness of 
aid, through its impact on GDP growth or poverty, the literature finds that aid has had no 
impact on average. Aid has not been found to spur growth or increase the quality of life.
1 
This has been at the origin of donor fatigue and falling aid commitments from the donor 
community, which has expressed concern about the quality of the assistance it provides to 
developing countries.
2 
An influential paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000) shows that aid works if it is 
targeted to appropriate countries, and a country is an appropriate candidate for the receipt 
of aid if it conducts good economic policies.
3 This important result has promoted the rise 
of selectivity. For aid to be most effective, it should target countries best able to translate 
a dollar of aid into growth or poverty reduction. As shown by Collier and Dollar (2002), 
                                                 
1 Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) are the rare exceptions to that rule. They show that aid unconditionally has 
a positive impact on growth rates. 
2 See Statement of the Development Committee of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
during their sixty-sixth meeting in Washington D.C. on September 28, 2002. 
3 Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2003) show that the Burnside and Dollar results are not robust to the 
addition of new data. Indeed, the significant positive statistical correlation between aid and growth in a 
sound policy environment falls apart when either more countries are added, or a longer time period is 
considered. 2
being selective can produce large gains.
4 Indeed, according to these authors the impact of 
aid on reducing poverty could have been doubled had the available aid been used in a 
poverty-efficient manner. 
As noted by Roodman (2003), although there is a general consensus that donors 
should be selective, what criteria they should use is still open to debate. Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) have established an index of economic selectivity. Boone (1996) shows 
that the impact of aid does depend on the political regime of the recipient country. 
Svensson (1999) and Kosack (2003) also show that politics is an important ingredient for 
how efficiently a country uses aid to generate improved development indicators. A 
country is therefore an appropriate candidate for foreign assistance if it implements sound 
economic policies and is democratic, or has good institutions. These results derived using 
a macro framework have been confirmed by micro studies. Indeed, Kaufmann and Wang 
(1995) and Isham and Kaufmann (1999) show, using World Bank-funded investment 
projects, that the probability of success and the economic rate of return (ERR) of projects 
are significantly lower in very distorted economies. The recently developed aid-quality 
indices, such as those in Easterly (2002) and Roodman (2003), mirror these results and 
have selectivity as their central element.  
The quality measure used in this paper differs sharply from aid-quality indices 
developed in the literature. To understand the difference, it is helpful to break up the aid 
delivery chain into the upstream end where donors operate and the downstream end 
populated by recipient countries. The quality measures thus far devised put all the 
emphasis on who gets aid, and are thus driven by the characteristics of the downstream 
actors. This paper investigates whether how aid is delivered matters and therefore 
considers aid design as a paramount element of quality. It shifts the focus to the donors in 
the process. 
 
1.1 Measuring  Donors’  Impact 
Among the shortcomings of the aid effectiveness literature is its treatment of aid 
as a pure income transfer, in which donors write a check to the recipient country to relax 
the country’s budget constraint. Aid, however, is delivered as structural programs, 
sectoral projects, and budget support to name a few. The latter form of assistance is the 
closest to a pure income transfer. All other forms of assistance are mostly donor-
packaged from conceptualization to implementation. Foreign assistance is but the 
collection of projects and programs offered by different multilateral aid agencies or 
bilateral donors and is certainly not a pure income transfer. In effect, some analysts argue 
that a dollar of aid has a higher value than a domestic dollar because aid comes bundled 
with superior knowledge. The literature has thus been cognizant of a possible design 
                                                 
4 Llavador and Roemer (2001) also show that aid should be allocated in a manner that rewards governments 
that make efforts to have a well managed economy, taking into account the country’s ‘circumstances’ to 
equalize opportunities. 3
effect, although, to the best of our knowledge, this paper offers the first attempt for its 
estimation. If there exists a design effect, the mere aggregation of the amounts disbursed 
under the different projects and programs leads to a biased estimate of the impact of aid 
on growth. In the same vein, donor performance ranking implicitly assumes that every 
dollar of aid has the same value. One can, however, legitimately assume that donors are 
not equally effective at designing their programs. Even programs of the same donor are 
likely to display differences in quality.
5 
Several attempts have been made to measure whether donors have an impact on 
the outcome of their programs through variables under their control. Dollar and Svensson 
(2000) analyze World Bank–funded structural adjustment programs and show that once 
the variables under the control of the donor are properly instrumented for, they have no 
impact on the program’s probability of success. Only the political variables of the 
recipient country matter. However, Deininger, Squire, and Basu (1998) and Kilby (2000) 
also analyze World Bank–funded projects, and convincingly demonstrate that donor 
efforts can improve the quality of aid. Deininger, Squire, and Basu (1998) show that the 
stock of prior analytical work improves the quality of the World Bank lending portfolio, 
whereas Kilby (2000) suggests that the timing and intensity of supervision are important 
donor variables that may yield a positive effect on the project’s probability of success. 
Thus, there are several strings the donor can pull to improve the quality of its aid. This 
paper also studies the effectiveness of World Bank–funded projects. The focus is on 
World Bank projects because of the unavailability of the data on other donors’, both 
bilateral and multilateral, projects and programs. The World Bank will thus be used as a 
proxy for the community of donors. 
Most models of donor behavior consider the donor as a ‘black box’ entity. All the 
staff in the donor’s agency are identical and have preferences perfectly aligned with that 
of the donor’s. The literature considers donors to be altruistic, namely that they care only 
about poverty reduction or the development impact of the projects they implement. For 
instance Svensson (2000) and Azam and Laffont (2003)
6 consider a donor that cares 
about the consumption of the poor in the recipient country. The donor impacts the 
welfare of the poor by offering to the recipient government an aid contract contingent on 
raising the consumption level of the poor. For Adams and O’Connell (1999) donors act in 
the public interest of the recipient country. In the few instances where the incentives of 
staff in aid agencies are addressed, the literature again views them as pure altruists. For 
instance, Deininger, Squire, and Basu (1998) consider a country manager who wants to 
maximize the quality of the lending portfolio and its policy impact by choosing the 
optimal budget allocation between the volume of lending and analytical work. Their 
                                                 
5 The quality indices implicitly consider aid to be donor-neutral. Indeed, two donors that give the same 
volume of aid to identical recipients would score the same in terms of quality irrespective of how well their 
projects fare. 
6 Azam and Laffont (2003) consider multilateral aid agencies (MAI) as non-benevolent intermediaries 
between the bilateral donor and its recipient country. The MAI has a superior information on the country’s 
willingness to redistribute to poor people (its type) and “sells” this information to the bilateral donor. 4
project manager also maximizes the quality of the project by optimally allocating time 
between preparation and supervision.
7 In Svensson (2003), although the project manager 
might have strong incentives to ‘spend the budget’ as in Mosley (1996), the objective of 
the manager is still to reduce poverty in the recipient country. 
The assumption that donors are purely benevolent and pursue poverty reduction in 
their client countries is arguable, even more so is the assumption that all staff within the 
donor’s agency share the same drive for poverty reduction. This paper differs from most 
of the aid literature by assuming that staffers of an aid agency maximize their own 
welfare, which is independent from poverty reduction or the developmental impact of the 
projects and programs they design. In a moral hazard framework, it will be shown that 
the quality of aid is endogenous to the relationship between the donor and the recipient 
country. Indeed, the quality of projects will depend not only on the amount of effort the 
staff in the donor’s agency devotes to its design, but also on the “type” of government in 
the recipient country, in a sense that will be made clear later in the analysis. Promotion 
and staff career concerns will be at the core of the incentive system in the donor’s 
agency. Two simple incentive systems and their impact on the quality of the projects will 
be studied in the theoretical part of the paper. The first one assumes that a staff member is 
promoted whenever she manages to get a project accepted, irrespective of the project’s 
performance. In the second incentive system, the project’s outcome matters and 
promotion happens only if the project is successful. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
provides summary statistics. Section 3 introduces the basic theoretical model. Section 4 
offers a resolution of the model and presents the equilibrium that prevails depending on 
the incentive regime. Section 5 sets out the econometric model and the estimation 
strategy. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
As pointed out in Wapenhans (1992), project performance is a function of 
international, country, and project variables, which can be closely intertwined. This paper 
focuses on country and project factors. The data used for the analysis are drawn from two 
sources. For country-level variables, the paper uses indicators developed by Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) and updated by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2003). These indicators, widely known as KKZ variables, are (a) voice and 
accountability, (b) political stability, (c) government effectiveness, (d) regulatory quality, 
(e) rule of law, and (f) control of corruption. For project-level variables ratings attributed 
                                                 
7 The country manager oversees the country’s project portfolio, which is a collection of projects each 
managed by one staff under the authority of the country manager. The lending volume is simply the sum of 
the sizes (in dollars) of all the projects. Analytical work is a ‘local’ public good that benefits all project 
managers by providing them with valuable information on the country circumstances, which can improve 
the quality of all projects in the portfolio. 5
by the independent Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank are 
used. Each year OED assesses a number of projects completed two to three years earlier 
for their development impact, likelihood of sustainability, and so forth. OED’s projects 
database also includes the size of the loan, and effort levels by donor and borrower at 
various stages of the project life cycle. 
Projects closed since 1990 have been rated. Although OED ratings may be 
considered biased, several authors inside and outside the Bank, among others Deininger, 
Squire, and Basu (1998), Dollar and Svensson (2000), and Kilby (2000), deem them to be 
reliable measures of a project’s success or failure. The performance of the World Bank 
during the supervision and implementation of the project is rated. One of the most 
important project ratings is quality at entry, which is also our measure of a project’s 
quality. Quality at entry is intended to capture the suitability of the project’s design to the 
country. It rates (1) the project concept, and (2) the realism of the objectives and 
approach used during identification and preparation. The client country’s performance is 
rated according to the country’s effort during the preparation and implementation stages 
of the project, and the country’s compliance with its commitments and the project’s 
covenants. All ratings run from Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory on a four-
level ladder. The overall performance or outcome of the project after completion is also 
rated on the same scale. The KKZ variables have estimates for four periods 1996, 1998, 
2000, and 2002. The score attributed to a country in this paper is a simple average of all 
four estimates. Other variables of interest collected on the project are its size in millions 
of current dollars, the amount of resources spent on preparation and supervision,
8 the 
sector in which the project has been undertaken, whether it is a concessional loan and so 
forth. From an original population of 3,179 projects, only 1,749 have complete ratings, of 
which 52 other projects display a size of zero and have been excluded. This leaves us 
with 1,697 projects for our sample. 
Table 1 shows the KKZ governance indicators by region. KKZ indicators, by 
construction, range from –2.5 to 2.5, and higher scores mean better governance. Clearly, 
Africa and South Asia have the worst environments with respect to governance. African 
countries display by far the worst environments, be it in terms of government capacity, 
regulatory quality, or control of corruption. Africa falls far short of the average for all 
indicators. Compared to Africa, Latin American countries are on the opposite side of the 
governance spectrum. They have better regulatory environments and the most efficient 
and accountable governments. 
Labeling satisfactory and highly satisfactory projects as successful, table 2 
presents the environment in which projects succeed or fail along with a few 
                                                 
8 Many papers consider the number of staff weeks as the relevant measure for preparation and supervision. 
However, the value of one staff week varies depending on the profile of the staff (experience, grade, and so 
forth). The time input of each staff is assigned a “price” depending on her profile. The resources on 
preparation and supervision reflect the value of the aggregate time devoted by the staff in the project, 
taking into account price differences. This measure is used in the paper instead of the number of weeks. 6
characteristics of these projects. Table 2 is reminiscent of Dollar and Svensson (2000, 
table 2). Clearly, unfavorable political and economic environments seem to jeopardize a 
project’s chances of success. Indeed, all six governance indicators are significantly lower 
for failed projects, whereas all projects seem very similar otherwise. Most of the results 
in Dollar and Svensson (2000) are confirmed here. For instance, with regard to the 
variables under the Bank’s control, a project’s size does not seem to be a good predictor 
of failure or success. The Bank also invests the same amount of resources for project 
preparation regardless of the subsequent result. The paper also finds that failed projects 
garner more supervision, which is endogenous as observed by Deininger, Squire, and 
Basu (1998) and Dollar and Svensson (2000). Indeed, the staff invests more resources to 
salvage bad projects in vain. This mere fact reinforces the idea that design is the most 
important feature of a project. 
Looking at tables 1 and 2 one would expect projects to fail more often in Africa, 
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and South Asia 
Region (SAR), and to succeed in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and East and 
Central Asia (ECA). Table 3, which also provides summary statistics on the projects by 
region, broadly confirms one’s expectations. Only EAP’s projects fare better than 
expected. More than 38 percent of the projects fail in Africa, contrasting with a mere 19 
percent in LAC. The odds for a project to succeed are 73.4 percent, but this probability 
falls to 61.5 percent for Africa and 68 percent for MENA, but reaches 80.9 percent for 
LAC projects. African projects are quite small, less than half the average project size. 
African countries are also usually small economies, so the project size may reflect the 
size of the economy. Moreover, size does not seem to matter for project success as 
suggested by table 2. Gathering all this evidence, it seems that aid in fact cannot be 
effective unless the environment is economically and politically sound. These prima facie 
facts do indeed call for more selectivity in aid allocation. 
How does project design fit in this picture? The lower panel of table 3 gives the 
distribution of quality at entry within regions, and table 4 presents the joint distribution of 
quality at entry and performance. Strikingly enough, projects quality at entry and 
performance seem to have similar regional distributions. “Bad” environments have a 
higher rate of project failure relative to “good” environments. However, they also receive 
a higher percentage of poorly designed projects. Moreover, the correlation between 
quality at entry and performance is quite high, at around 0.6. Indeed, more than 72 
percent (1,237) of the projects confirm, after implementation, the prediction OED gave 
on their rating at entry. Only about 18 percent of the projects rated in one category at time 
of entry (in gray) end up with a different rating after the project is completed (in white). 
Quality at entry therefore seems to be a powerful predictor of the project’s success or 
failure. Projects are implemented in different environments and one might accept that 
they perform differently because of the differences in country environments. The 
explanation for the parallel regional variation in design quality is less obvious, however, 
because a single donor is responsible for the design across all regions. Because donors 7
might have an impact on the quality of their aid, through the design effect, this calls for 
caution in the use of selectivity as exclusively based on recipient characteristics. 
3.  Theoretical Model 
This section proposes a simple theoretical framework that rationalizes the fact that 
aid only works in good environments. It is claimed here that this outcome is endogenous 
to the type of the borrower and the incentive system the project’s designer faces. The two 
main actors in the model are the staff in the international aid agency, which designs the 
project, and the borrowing country’s government. It is a simple two-period game, at 
period t = 0, the staff designs the project and the client country accepts or rejects the 
proposal. If the project is refused, the staff is not promoted and the country does not have 
any project. If the project is accepted, at t = 1 the performance of the project is observed 
and the staff’s promotion decision is taken, depending on the incentive regime that 
prevails. The government and the population assess the state of the economy irrespective 
of whether a project is implemented and elections take place. 
The aid agency proposes and finances development projects and programs in a 
number of developing countries. The aid agency’s mission is to help countries escape 
from their poverty trap, or put them on a development growth path. To accomplish this 
mission the aid agency hires its staff
9 and sets up its internal incentive system within 
which the staff operates. An incentive system determines the promotion criteria for the 
staff based on their (relative) performance. Only two types of incentive systems will be 
considered here: (a) promotion occurs if the staff member manages to sell a project to a 
borrower country; and (b) promotion occurs only if the sale of a project to a borrower 
country also results in a successful project. Objective performance measures are readily 
available for both incentive systems. The mere observation of an implemented project is 
sufficient for promotion under the first incentive system. For the second system, 
international aid agencies have developed sophisticated measures of project success or 
failure to evaluate performance. 
The staff of the aid agency is assumed to maximize their welfare and take the 
internal incentive system as given. This assumption is in contrast with most of the foreign 
aid literature. As pointed out by Deininger, Squire, and Basu (1998) the staff in 
international aid agencies are heavily involved in the design and conceptualization of 
projects and programs. Projects are designed by the staff that then negotiate with the 
borrower country’s government that may take or leave the offer. The promotion of the 
staff depends on the internal incentive system, and means a higher wage in the following 
period. The welfare of the staff is a function of wage and effort exerted for project design. 
Each staff is also characterized by an ability parameter known only to them which 
                                                 
9 It is assumed that the aid agency has the resources to (and will) hire highly qualified individuals who are 
competitive on the international labor market. In its recruitment process the agency aims at identifying both 
highly skilled and dedicated individuals. The hiring process is imperfect, however, so staff will vary in 
terms of ability and degree of dedication to development. 8
influences the probability of a successful project. Let  , β  the ability of the staff, be 
distributed on the compact support  ] , [ H L β β  according to the density f(β) and the c.d.f. 
F(β). A staff maximization program can be written as 
 
[] ) ( )) , | Pr( 1 ( ) ( ) , | Pr( ) ( ) ( max e e promotion s u e promotion S u s u
e ψ β β δ − − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +  (1) 
where u( ) is a concave utility function, s is the entry salary, S (>>s) is the salary if and 
when promoted, δ is the discount rate, e is the effort level which also satisfies  , 1             0 ≤ ≤ e  
and ) (⋅ ψ  is a convex function representing the disutility of exerting effort. Consistent 
with the career concern literature, the staff does not exert any effort in the second and last 
period of the game. The probability of being promoted depends, in part, on the incentive 
system in place in the international aid agency. The salary increase following a promotion 
is assumed to be high enough for the staff to be willing to exert maximum effort if it 
secures promotion. This is satisfied if the following condition holds: 
 
0 ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( > − ⋅ + ψ δ S u s u .         ( A 1 )  
For the sake of simplicity, all projects are the same regarding their cost C and 
potential “full” benefit B. The costs C
10 are to be repaid by the borrowing member 
country as soon as the project is accepted. On the other hand the benefit that accrues to 
the country will depend on the design of the project. The country reaps a portion 
e ⋅ + β π  of the potential full benefit B, where π is sheer luck and commonly known, and 
e is the costly effort the staff puts into the design of the project. The expected return of a 
project designed by a staff of talent β and who devotes effort e to the project is simply:  
 
Expected Return | β, e =  . ) ( C B e − ⋅ + β π
11 
For a similar level of effort, staff with higher abilities bring a higher rate of return. 
The ability of the staff and the effort they provide multiplicatively determine the value 
added of the staff into the project. In this model, unlike the additive one, staff ability is 
valuable only insofar as they put effort into the project. Indeed, staff who make no effort 
in the design of their project have no value added irrespective of how talented they are. 
To quote Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999), “talent matters little if the [staff] shirks, 
but makes an important difference if the [staff] ‘tries to make things happen.’”
12 To avoid 
a degenerate problem, the following assumptions are necessary: 
 
                                                 
10 The international financial institution actually lends an amount C/(1+r) to the country where r is the 
borrowing interest rate the countries face. We are concerned here with neither the optimal reward system of 
the agency nor the optimal size of its loans and interest rates. These questions are left for future research. 
11 An alternative and equivalent specification would be to consider the staff’s effort to influence the 
probability of success of the project, which is  e e success P ⋅ + = β π β ) , | (  for a project that yields B in 
case of success and zero when it fails. The country would then consider the project’s expected net benefit. 
12 See Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999). 9






< .        ( A 2 )  
The first part of assumption A2 simply states that for a project to be beneficial, 
the staff has to put a minimum effort into its design. In other words, projects with no staff 
input have a negative return, and only increase the country’s level of indebtedness. The 
second part of A2 tells us that staff at the bottom of the talent distribution cannot design a 
successful project no matter how much effort they make. However, a portion of the staff 
have the ability to design successful projects. That marginal staff who by exerting 
maximum effort can generate a zero-return project is  ,
* π β − = B C  all staff with higher 
ability can, if they put the required effort, design good projects. 
The government of the client country borrows the funds and implements the 
project. The government is characterized both by its capacity (ability to screen proposed 
projects) and its level of accountability (the willingness of the government to accept 
projects likely to improve the welfare of the population). 
The government can be of either high (cH) or low (cL) capacity.
13 A high capacity 
government is able to exactly pinpoint the expected economic return of a proposed 
project, whereas for a low capacity government projects are indistinguishable. In the 
jargon of Sah and Stiglitz (1986), the government’s capacity is its screening function. A 
high capacity government is therefore a perfect screener, whereas a low capacity 
government has no discriminating capability. Although it can assess the worth of any 
project, the high capacity government knows neither the ability of the staff nor is it able 
to determine the amount of effort invested in the design of the project. Low capacity 
governments on the other hand rely on “trust” to judge the project. Trust can be 
parameterized by the (minimum) proportion of the project’s full benefit, 
* π  that the 
government believes it will get when dealing with the aid agency. Therefore the 
government expects the project to have a return  .
* C B − π  The trust parameter may 
depend on the history of the country and aid agency relationship, and/or the aid agency’s 
reputation. It is supposed to be known to all parties for the sake of simplicity. 
Following Ferejohn (1986), we assume that the government is judged by its 
current performance and is re-elected if the welfare of the population is greater than W, 
the minimum (increase in) level of welfare the population. This threshold defines the 
level of accountability of the government to its population, and is distributed on the 
support  ].      ,     [    W W W ∈
14 For instance a negative threshold would mean that even if the 
welfare of the population deteriorates, the government will safely be re-elected. For 
dictatorial regimes, W certainly tends to negative infinity. A high and positive threshold 
signals a very demanding population that wants good performers and is able to exercise 
                                                 
13 Screening capacity could have been represented along a continuum without changing the basic result of 
the paper, but at the expense of analytical complications. 
14 See also Seabright (1996) for a similar definition of accountability. 10
its voice and vote non-performing administrations out of office. In case the government 
accepts the project, the (increase in the) population’s welfare is represented by the 
expected return of the projects. Should the government refuse the project, the state of the 
economy is fully determined by a random shock, which follows a normal distribution 
with zero mean. Therefore the government is sure to be reinstated if the projects it 
accepts bring forth an outcome greater than W. But when the government refuses a 
project it is re-elected with probability  ). ( 1 W Φ −  
Let us formalize the government’s decision-making process when faced with a 
project. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the government always gets a 
personal gain, G, from a financed project. This personal gain is not contingent on the 
outcome of the project, it is for instance the amount the government can divert from the 
funds released for the financing of the project. The value of holding office for the 
government is given by V. Therefore the government’s instantaneous welfare is given by 
V + G if it accepts the project and V if it rejects it. The acceptance or refusal of the 
project, however, affects the probability of re-election and therefore the next period’s 
welfare. The government’s anticipated next period utility is V if it keeps office and zero 
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where ξ  is equal to  e ⋅ + β π  or 
* π  depending on the government’s screening capacity, 
and ) ( W C B P ≥ − ⋅ ξ  is a zero-one indicator. The government accepts (refuses) the 
project if  
 
V W V V W C B P V G ⋅ Φ − ⋅ + < ≥ ⋅ ≥ − ⋅ ⋅ + + )) ( 1 (    )   (   ) ( δ ξ δ    (2) 
Equation (2) governs the decision-making on the project. It defines the 
participation constraint of the government. Clearly, whenever the project is deemed 
“good,” it has an expected return that permits re-election and the government approves of 
it. The government will still accept a bad project,  W C B < − ⋅ ξ , if the personal profit 
from accepting the project now is greater than the discounted value of holding office at t 
= 1, due to pure luck after refusing the project at t = 0, i.e. if  V W G ⋅ Φ − ⋅ > )) ( 1 ( δ . Less 
accountable governments would display a higher propensity to accept bad projects. To 
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δ
δ
   1 * * .       ( A 3 )  
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A3 implies that all governments that willingly accept poorly designed projects just for the 
sake of their personal benefit, face a lack of accountability to the extent that they would 
have accepted any project anyway. This completes the description of the model. 
 
4. Equilibrium 
This section describes the equilibrium depending on the incentive systems that 
prevails in the aid agency. 
4.1  Spend the Budget Incentive System 
 
4.1.1.  High Capacity Government  
Suppose first that staff gets promoted whenever they sell a project to a borrowing 
country. Let a staff of ability β be matched with a country of accountability level W, 
which is also a perfect screener. With assumption A3, the government accepts the project 
if and only if the project’s return is equal to, or greater than, the required population 
welfare level that ensures its re-election. Since it can perfectly assess the return of the 
project, the latter is accepted if and only if  .    ) ( W C B e ≥ − ⋅ ⋅ + β π  The government 
accepts the project only if the value added of the staff’s effort,  ,    B C W B e ⋅ − + ≥ ⋅ ⋅ π β  
exceeds the sum of the minimum welfare required by the population and the cost of a 
poorly designed project. 
This equation also determines how much effort a staff needs to make to get a 
project accepted and secure promotion. Because effort is costly, the staff will provide the 
minimum input in terms of effort to ensure promotion. The profile of optimal efforts for 
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where  C B W − ⋅ + = ) ( ) (
* β π β  is the lowest level of accountability such that the staff of 
ability β will need to exert the maximum effort to get their project accepted. It is the 
staff’s “Peter Principle” accountability ceiling, the accountability level above which the 
staff is incompetent to design a project that is satisfactory to the government.
16 If the staff 
                                                 
15 Let define  ) ( * β W  and  ) ( * W β the maximum country accountability level for a staff of ability β to sell a 
project, and the minimum staff ability level for a country W to accept a project. They satisfy the equation 
W C B = − ⋅ + ) ( β π  when solved with respect to β and W, respectively. They are defined at the maximum 
effort level of the staff. 
16 See Peter and Hull (1969) or Fairburn and Malcomson (2001) for more on the Peter Principle. 12
meets a government whose accountability is greater that their Peter Principle ceiling, then 
even exerting the maximum effort is not enough for the staff to get her project through. In 
this case, the staff exerts no effort. As equation (3) clearly shows, it is more difficult for 
staff to sell a project to a country with a more demanding population. If the country is not 
accountable at all and can get away with a project value less than  C B − ⋅ π  the staff does 
not need to and thus makes no effort, whatever their ability. For more accountable 
countries, staff will need to exert some effort and the effort level increases linearly with 
the level of accountability. For countries with a very demanding population, ), (
* β W W >  
it is worthless for the staff to exert any effort because their project will be rejected. 
From the country’s perspective, all accepted projects will have a return that 
allows the government to exactly fulfill its commitment to reach the minimum welfare 
level. The country gets a project only if it is matched with staff whose ability is equal to 
or greater than  ) (
* W β  and therefore accepts a project with probability  )). ( ( 1
* W F β −
17 
 
4.1.2.  Low Capacity Government 
Suppose now the government in the client country is not effective enough at 
project screening. The parameter of interest is then the level of trust it has in its 
counterpart aid agency, and the decision process is very simple. Indeed, the country will 
accept the project if and only if the expected return is such that  W C B      
* ≥ − ⋅ π , if the 
level of trust the government has in the aid agency leads to an excepted return greater 
than the required minimum welfare level. For a given trust level, the lower the 
government’s accountability, the more likely is the acceptance of the project. 
From the perspective of the staff that want to ensure promotion, all that matters is 
whether the trust level is high enough for the country to accept the project. In any event 
the staff’s effort is zero. Indeed, if the government trusts the aid agency and 
systematically accepts the project, there is no need to put any effort in the project since 
effort is costly and a promotion is guaranteed because the project will be accepted. In the 
same vein, there is no need to put effort in a project if the trust level is too low and the 
project is systematically rejected. Therefore, in case of a low capacity government the 
profile of effort is very simple,  β β       0     ) (
* ∀ ≡ L e , the staff always shirks and the country 
accepts the project depending on its beliefs only. From A2, because the staff shirks all 
projects have a very poor design and a negative economic return. 
The discussion can be summarized in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: When the incentive system of the international aid agency is such that the 
promotion of the staff is contingent only on the acceptance of a project by a client country, the 
following is observed: 
                                                 
17 It is assumed that the matching between staff and countries is exogenous. However, one could easily 
imagine the aid agency implementing a sorting mechanism to maximize the number of accepted projects. 13
•  If the country has a weak screening capacity: the staff never puts effort in the design of the 
projects; all accepted projects have a negative return; for a given trust level, only countries 
with low accountability i.e.   
* C B W − ⋅ ≤π accept projects. 
•  If the country has a high screening capacity: the staff exerts minimum effort to get projects 
accepted; projects are accepted only if their return is at least equal to the accountability level 
of the government; low accountability governments will knowingly accept projects with 
negative returns; the more accountable the country the higher is the return of the accepted 
project, and the higher the staff’s effort. 
The profile of effort the staff exerts is given in figures 1 and 2 for high and low 
capacity governments, respectively. As shown in the figures, perfect screeners might very 
well accept negative return projects because of their lack of accountability coupled with 
personal gains accruing from the acceptance of a project. 
As is obvious from the above proposition, higher return projects are found in high 
capacity countries that are also more accountable to their population. Those governments 
refuse projects when not enough effort has been made to make them worthwhile. Low 
capacity countries, however, accept projects based on the trust level, and all accepted 
projects are of poor quality and end up being detrimental to the population. Indeed, the 
staff anticipate the likelihood of a government to accept (or refuse) the project, and have 
no incentive to put costly effort into the design of the project. This is a theoretical 
derivation of Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) result, where aid works in good environments 
but almost surely fails in bad ones. There is, however, a fundamental difference between 
the two results. For Burnside and Dollar (2000), all countries receive the same type of 
money, which is subsequently wasted in ‘bad’ environments. On the contrary, in this 
paper ‘bad’ environments receive ‘bad’ money as a result of their low accountability and 
lack of capacity to filter aid money, coupled with absence of incentives for aid agency 
staff to propose ‘good’ aid in such environments. 
4.2.  Wisely Spend the Budget Incentive System 
As proposition 1 shows, two necessary ingredients have to be present for the 
country to receive good quality aid projects. First, the government must have the ability 
to screen and gauge the capacity of projects to bring about economic prosperity. Second, 
the government has to be accountable “enough” to its citizenry to resist bad projects just 
for its personal advantage. Whenever one of these ingredients is missing bad projects will 
be accepted. There is thus a sorting mechanism such that good governments, both 
politically and economically, attract good aid, whereas weak or low-accountability 
countries attract bad aid. Can a remedy be found to ensure that aid works even in bad 
environments? Part of the answer lies in the re-design of the incentive systems for staff in 
international aid agencies.  
Let us now turn to the evaluation of the second incentive system. In this system, 
the promotion of staff is contingent on the performance of the project designed for the 
client country. Let us suppose that the staff is promoted only if the return to the project is 14
higher than a preset minimum level ϕ which for equity reasons is the same for all projects 
irrespective of the country or staff. It is assumed that the return of the project can be 
readily assessed by the agency.
18 
4.2.1. High Capacity Government  
What is the effort level exerted by staff when matched with a high capacity 
government. Because the government can assess the probability of success of the project, 
the staff is promoted if and only if the project satisfies  )    , ( Max        ) ( W C B e ϕ β π ≥ − ⋅ ⋅ + . 
The project must pass the minimum standard test. Indeed, the project is not accepted by 
the country if it does not exceed its re-election threshold and even if it does, the staff is 
not promoted unless enough effort is exerted to meet the institution’s requirement. It is 
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* ϕ β β < . What are the effects 
introduced by this incentive system with respect to the first one. First of all there is no 
difference for countries whose accountability threshold is greater than the aid agency’s 
standard. There is, however, a lower probability that a country will have a project 
because all staff whose ability is lower than  ) (
* ϕ β  will put zero effort in the design of 
their project. Such projects will only be accepted by countries whose accountability level 
is lower than  C B − ⋅ π ; moreover, the staff member is not promoted. Such countries 
accept all projects in both systems, anyway. For countries between  C B − ⋅ π  and ϕ they 
refuse all projects when they are matched with staff with an ability lower than β
*(ϕ). 
Hence, some projects with positive returns are lost. Indeed, beneficial matches between 
accountable countries (W > 0) and staff with ability  ), ( ) (
* * ϕ β β β < < W  cannot 
materialize in this system. To compensate for this, failures due to non-accountability and 
bad incentive are avoided. Indeed, all countries such that  0 < < − ⋅ W C B π  that would 
have accepted negative return projects now do not have that option any more, all projects 
before them fare worse than they can accept due to the lack of design effort from the 
staff. 
All staff with ability levels above the Peter Principle ceiling defined by the aid 
agency’s standard, i.e.  ), (
* ϕ β β ≥  have the opportunity to be promoted. Whenever such 
a staff is matched with non accountable governments, their effort will compensate for that 
lack of accountability to generate beneficial projects. As a matter of fact, when the staff 
meet a government such that  ϕ ≤ W  then the effort level exerted is such that the agency’s 
standard is just met and the project will have an economic return of ϕ. 
                                                 
18 For the World Bank, a project is satisfactory if its ERR is at least 10 percent. 15
4.2.2.  Low Capacity Government 
If the staff is matched with a low ability government that has a trust parameter 
* π  
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* ϕ β β ≥  and  0 ) (
* * ≡ β L e  for lower ability staff. For low capacity government, for the 
same level of trust, things can only get better with respect to the first incentive system. 
Indeed, suppose they always accept a project because they find the aid agency 
trustworthy. Then if the country is matched with a staff with ability  ) (
* ϕ β β <  then it 
will still have a project with negative returns as before. On the other hand, if the staff’s 
ability is  ) (
* ϕ β β ≥  the country will have a project that meets the agency’s standard. 
However, because of its lack of capacity to screen projects the country will still not have 
a project that meets its accountability level when this one is greater than the standard set 
by the agency. 
The following proposition summarizes this section: 
 
Proposition 2: When the incentive system of the international aid agency is such that the 
promotion of the staff is contingent on both the acceptance of a project by a client country and 
the requirement of an economic return higher than the agency’s standard ϕ, then the following is 
observed: 
•  If the country has a weak screening capacity: the project is accepted if the country’s 
accountability satisfies    ;  
* C B W − ⋅ ≤π  staff with ability β such that β
*(ϕ) ≥ β  exert no effort 
in project’s design, and propose negative economic return projects to the country; all staff 
who can meet the standard put the minimum effort required to exactly match it and propose 
projects with economic return ϕ  irrespective of the country’s level of accountability. 
•  If the country has a high screening capacity: projects are accepted only if their return is at 
least equal to the accountability level of the country; staff with ability β such β
*(ϕ) ≥ β  exert 
no effort in the design of the project and propose negative economic return projects to the 
country, only governments with accountability lower than  C B − ⋅ π  accept projects; staff 
with ability β such that β
*(W) > β ≥ β
*(ϕ) cannot meet the country’s standard will not exert 
any effort and the project will be rejected; staff with ability β  such that β ≥ Max(β
*(ϕ), 
β
*(W)) will exert the effort to just meet the minimum standard, the effort level is higher the 
more accountable the country. 
Proposition 2 shows that with this incentive system bad projects may still find 
their way to weak capacity countries that trust the international agency. However, with 
respect to the first incentive system in which they got bad projects with certainty, there is 
now a positive probability that will they get a beneficial project. The probability of 
accepting bad projects depends both on the distribution of staff ability and the standard of 
the agency. The more the distribution is skewed to the left, and the higher the standard, 16
the greater the chances for bad projects being accepted. The international agency faces a 
tradeoff in the choice of the optimal standard. 
It is the binding side of the incentive system that drives effort. As long as the 
agency’s standard is higher than the country’s accountability level to its citizenry, the 
staff will exert enough effort to just reach the standard. For more demanding countries, it 
is the standard set by the country that determines the effort the staff has to exert in order 
for the project to be accepted. In any event, whether the project will attain any standard 
depends on the ability of the staff to exceed the Peter Principle ceiling defined by the 
government’s accountability. Figure 3, shows the effort profiles under both incentive 
systems. 
5. Econometric  Analysis 
This section explores the determinants of both the quality of the project design 
and project performance. It also aims at providing an accurate estimate of the impact of 
the quality of a project on its probability of success. Let quality and performance be 
determined by: 
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where 1(⋅) represents the indicator function, and 
*
ij P  and 
*
ij Q , respectively, denote 
unobserved latent variables for performance and quality at entry of project i in country j. 
The superscripts p and q refer to performance and quality, respectively, and Xi, and Zj 
represent project and country specific factors. The factors specific to the projects may 
include variables such as size, whether it is an adjustment or investment project, or more 
sophisticated variables, such as measures effort by both the donor and the recipient 
country at various stages of the project cycle. Country-specific factors will typically 
include institutional capacity, political, and economic variables.
19 
A natural continuous variable candidate for measuring performance is the 
economic rate of return (ERR) of the project. Unfortunately, projects in social sectors do 
not lend themselves easily to such measurement and have no ERR. They need to be 
evaluated using some other yardstick. The Operations Evaluation Department has 
developed performance indicators that proxy those quantitative measures when output is 
not directly observable. All projects are consistently evaluated with these indicators. 
Contrary to performance, there is no obvious continuous variable to quantify quality. A 
                                                 
19 Note that because of high correlation (pair-wise coefficient of correlation higher than 0.85) between three 
of the governance variables, namely government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption, only 
government effectiveness will be retained in the econometric analysis. 17
methodology for producing quality indicators has also been developed within the World 
Bank, and these indicators are used here. The analysis uses the indicator variables  1 = ij P  
if the project is deemed to have performed satisfactorily by OED and  0 = ij P  otherwise. 
The quality at entry of the project is satisfactory when  1 = ij Q  and  0 = ij Q  otherwise. 
Because quality and performance are dichotomous variables, equations (6) and (7) 
will be estimated with the standard probit regression model. The problem with estimating 
equations (6) and (7) is that quality might be endogenous and the disturbances uij and εij 
correlated. In this case, estimating the equations separately will produce biased estimates 
for equation (7). Not only would the impact of quality on the probability of success be 
biased, but also the coefficients attached to the other covariates may be adversely 
affected. The alternative is to simultaneously estimate the equations as a system. The 
appropriate model is then a recursive simultaneous bivariate probit because the quality at 
entry is present in the performance equation.
20 The errors are correlated and jointly 
distributed as a bivariate normal with  , 0 ) ( ) ( = = ij ij E u E ε  , 1 ) ( ) ( = = ij ij Var u Var ε  and 
. ) , ( ρ ε = ij ij u Cov  
For the bivariate probit model to be identified and effective, there must exist 
either valid exclusion or functional form restrictions, or one should assume equal 
selection on observed and unobserved variables, an alternative identification strategy 
suggested by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2000). The equal selection rule amounts to 
imposing a set of restrictions on the correlation coefficient of the errors and heavily 
hinges on the fact that observed exogenous variables have been randomly chosen from a 
large pool of candidates and had equal probability of being picked up than unobserved 
ones. This assumption does not apply well in our setting, for most of the data has been 
collected for the specific purpose of studying the effectiveness of the projects. On the 
other hand, functional form restrictions would imply for instance the imposition of f and 
g to be linear or polynomial in their arguments,
21 and this is not necessary here as showed 
by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2002). This paper uses exclusion restrictions for 
identification, it requires that there be at least one exogenous variable that impacts the 
probability of success only through its effect on quality. This variable enters the quality 
equation but is excluded from the performance equation (see Maddala 1983, p.122-123), 
or Bollen, Guilkey, and Mroz (1995). In other words, the following condition 








i Z X Z X ⊄  must be satisfied. 
The paper uses two identifiers. The first one is the cumulative number of 
economic and sector work (ESW) deliveries for a specific country up to the date of entry 
                                                 
20 However, as suggested by Angrist (1991) and confirmed by Evans and Schwab (1995), and Evans, 
Farrely, and Montgomery (1999) in practice the average treatment effects obtained by the bivariate probit 
are close to the estimates that would result from two-stage least squares models. 
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*  as the system to be estimated with β being the primary parameter of 
interest. 18
of the project in the portfolio. This variable represents the stock of knowledge 
accumulated by the international aid agency on the country’s economic and social 
environments. On purely theoretical grounds the number of ESWs should determine the 
quality of future projects by providing valuable analytical input for their design. There is 
no reason to expect it to influence the performance of any specific project during 
implementation. Deininger, Squire, and Basu (1998) show that the number of ESWs has a 
strong positive impact on the quality of World Bank loans. The second identifier, the 
borrower’s quality of preparation, is assessed by OED and quantifies the quality of the 
client country’s involvement in the project at the preparation stage. It can also proxy the 
degree of the country’s ownership and commitment for the project. The identifiers are 
valid to the extent that (a) they are determinants of the quality at entry of a project, but 
(b) are not correlated with its performance. The validity of these instruments will be 
assessed later in the analysis. 
5.1  The Single-Equation Probit Models 
Before turning to the full model, it is worthwhile to investigate the single equation 
models for both performance and quality at entry. 
5.1.1.  The Determinants of Performance 
Table 5 reports separate estimates of the probit regressions. The project’s quality 
at entry enters only in regression 4, presented in the last column of the left panel. Notice 
that voice and accountability and the regulatory quality are significant in none of the 
regressions that aim at explaining performance. This is all the more surprising for the 
regulatory quality that captures the quality of the economic environment is found highly 
and positively significant by most studies. 
Regression 1 includes only a restricted set of explanatory variables: the 
governance indicators. Political stability and government effectiveness seem to be 
relevant indicators in explaining the projects’ performance. However, with a pseudo R-
square of only 3 percent, almost all of the variation in project performance remains 
unexplained. Therefore, there are certainly many variables omitted in this regression and 
performance can by no means be explained by country characteristics alone. In regression 
2 we add loan characteristics and regional dummies as new covariates. Political stability 
loses its explanatory power with these additions, and the R-square goes now to 16 
percent. In regression 3 the quality of the borrower country’s involvement in the project 
and the supervision effort of the World Bank are further considered. Interestingly, adding 
these variables allows us to explain about 55 percent of performance variation. 
Government effectiveness is still significant, but only at 10 percent, and a marginal 
increase in the effectiveness of the government increases the probability of success by 8 
percent. All variables concerning the borrower and agency’s involvement are highly and 
positively significant. Finally, once the quality at entry of the project is controlled for, 
government effectiveness is no more significant in explaining performance. However, all 19
variables related to the borrower and the World Bank’s involvement are quite robust and 
remain highly significant, although with a slightly reduced impact. African projects are 6 
percent less likely to perform well and the negative impact is strongly significant across 
all regressions, although the impact is gradually reduced as more covariates are 
controlled for. 
Overall, a project with a satisfactory quality at entry has a huge 17.5 percent 
higher probability of performing well than a poorly designed project. None of the 
governance variables is significant contrary to Dollar and Svensson (2000). The most 
powerful variable in explaining performance is the quality of the borrower’s 
implementation. Projects perform poorly in Africa and adjustment loans fare worse than 
investment loans. A sizeable variation is explained by this regression. The predictive 
ability of the model is also fairly good, with an average predicted probability of success 
for satisfactory projects of 90 percent versus 28 percent for failed projects. 
5.1.2.  The Determinants of Quality 
It is clear from the last section that an improvement in the quality of a project 
translates into much better prospects for good performance during implementation. It is 
therefore important to not only consider quality as endogenous, but also study its 
determinants for policy purposes. The right panel of table 5 presents regressions of 
projects’ quality at entry. The last regression on which we focus here explains 27 percent 
of the variation in quality, most of which comes from introducing the quality of the 
borrower preparation. Consistent with the finding of Deininger, Squire, and Basu (1998), 
the stock of ESWs has a positive impact on the quality of projects, with an additional 
piece of ESW increasing the chances of high quality projects in the future by almost 3 
percent. Europe and Central Asia, along with Latin America and the Caribbean have a 
greater probability of receiving high quality projects. The African dummy has a negative 
sign, though insignificant. Strangely enough, adjustment loans have a better quality at 
entry but perform poorly as shown in the previous section, which might stem from their 
high complexity. 
Voice and accountability and the quality of the regulatory framework have 
significant negative impacts, which seems counterintuitive at first sight. However, from 
our theoretical model, even a highly accountable government is likely to accept bad 
quality projects as long as its screening capacity is low. The negative effect of a sound 
economic environment on a project’s quality is much harder to rationalize and does not 
receive any obvious answer from our model. Government effectiveness has a strong 
positive impact on the probability of having a project with a marginal effect of 20 
percent. The most powerful explanatory variable is, however, the quality of the borrower 
preparation. Projects are thus more likely to be of good quality when the borrower’s 
screening capacity is high and the donor manages to have the borrowing government 
fully “on board.” A more committed borrower is more likely to make more effort in 
preparing the project which translates into higher quality. 20
5.2  The Bivariate Probit Specification 
The standard probit specifications considered in the previous section ignore the 
potential endogeneity of the quality at entry. Let us now turn to the more complex two-
equation models that address the endogeneity issue. Estimation results for the full 
bivariate probit models are presented in table 6. The associated marginal effects for 
model 6, the preferred specification, are in table 7. Model 1 includes only a restricted set 
of observables, namely the governance indicators. In model 2, the set of covariates is 
expanded to encompass all project characteristics except the Bank and client country 
effort-related variables. These latter are included in models 3 to 6. The quality at entry of 
the project enters the performance equation for specifications 5 and 6 only. Model 6 
(resp. model 4), is obtained by adding to model 5 (resp. model 3) the Bank’s supervisory 
performance in the project as assessed by OED. 
Can governance indicators alone explain both quality and performance? The 
answer is given in column 1. Whereas the regulatory framework and the accountability of 
the government are not significant in explaining performance or quality, both political 
stability and the effectiveness of the government have strong positive impacts on quality 
and performance. The highly significant coefficient of correlation of 0.78, however, 
suggests that there is a strong correlation between unobserved variables. Moreover, this 
model has a very poor predictive power and always predicts satisfactory quality and 
performance. Regression 2 introduces the number of ESWs as an identifier and an 
expanded set of covariates such as regional dummies, loan size, among others. The 
positive significant impact of government effectiveness in explaining performance and 
quality is strengthened while political stability drops out. The regulatory framework is 
now negatively correlated with the quality of the project. Both quality and performance 
deteriorate with higher government accountability. The positive correlation among 
unobservables remains stable at high positive levels. The predictive power of this 
regression is slightly higher than that of the previous model but it still puts too heavy a 
weight on the both satisfactory quality and the outcome event. 
The donor and borrower’s effort-related variables are present in models 3 to 6. 
The borrower’s involvement at the project’s preparatory stage is our second identifier and 
does therefore not belong to the performance equation. The borrower quality of 
implementation and compliance are present in all models, whereas Bank’s supervision is 
considered only in regressions 4 and 6. Regressions 3 and 4 are seemingly unrelated 
bivariate probits, and regressions 5 and 6 are recursive models whereby quality at entry is 
a right-hand side variable for performance as well. From regressions 4 and 6, it is clear 
than the quality of Bank supervision is quite important for the success of a project. 
Consistent with most of the findings in the literature a sound policy environment, proxied 
here by the quality of the regulatory framework, clearly increases the probability of 
success of a project as shown in regression 5. However, once the quality of Bank 
supervision is introduced in the model (regression 6), the economic environment matters 21
much less for project performance. Supervision effort may thus be more important than 
the quality of the policy environment in explaining a project’s performance, as also 
pointed out by Kilby (2000). 
Unlike the donor’s and borrower’s effort variables, governance indicators are 
poor predictors of project performance. Indeed, none of the indicators can explain project 
performance once quality at entry is taken into account. However, government 
effectiveness is a powerful predictor of quality at entry, as it displays a stable, positive 
and highly significant estimate in all regressions. The more effective the government the 
higher the quality of the projects it receives. From the borrower’s viewpoint, its 
involvement during the preparation of the project has a huge positive impact on quality. 
For performance, although the borrower’s compliance is quite important, it is the quality 
of implementation that matters most. Prior analytical work as given by the number of 
ESWs strongly influences the quality of the projects. Loan size matters neither for quality 
nor for performance. ECA, and LAC countries are more likely to receive high quality 
loans. Projects have a significant higher probability of failure in Africa. Quality was 
much lower during the 1980s, and IDA loans seem to have a better quality and higher 
probability of being satisfactory. 
The validity of the identifiers will be assessed through two tests. First, they must 
be significant predictors of project’s quality at entry. Second, they should be insignificant 
if included in the performance equation. The first test is easy and only involves checking 
whether ESWs and the quality of borrower preparation are jointly significant in the 
model. This is done through a simple Wald test, where the chi-squared test statistic with 
two degrees of freedom is equal to 261, making our identifiers jointly significant at any 
level. For the second test, as suggested by Bollen, Guilkey, and Mroz (1995) with n 
identifiers, one has to include n minus one of the identifiers in the performance equation 
in order to obtain a just identified model and then test for the (joint) significance of the 
identifiers. If the restrictions are valid, the identifiers should not be significant 
determinants of project performance. In this case n equals two so there are two possible 
combinations, and both have been tested. The chi-squared test statistic with one degree of 
freedom is equal to 1.21, and 0.67 when borrower preparation and the number of ESW 
are included in the performance equation. The null that these are not significant 
determinants cannot be rejected. One can now be confident that the exclusion restrictions 
are valid and therefore expect the estimates of the bivariate probit model to be robust. 
Typically, when the exclusion restrictions are not strong enough, the bivariate 
model performs very poorly. A fairly good signal of this is given by the variance of the 
estimates in the two-equation model, which are usually large relative to their counterpart 
in the simple probit regressions. In this model, however, comparing standard errors in 
tables 5 and 6, the coefficients of the bivariate probit display a precision similar to those 
in the single equation models. The bivariate probit therefore performs quite well in this 22
instance. Also, note that the standard errors have been adjusted for within-country 
clustering. 
 
5.2.1. Marginal  Effects 
While estimates tell us whether the variables are significant determinants of 
performance or quality, they do not tell us how important a determinant a variable is. 
Marginal effects provide us with this piece of information by computing the impact of a 
marginal change in a variable of interest on the probability of satisfactory quality and/or 
performance. Table 7 presents the marginal impacts of the exogenous variables on 
selected joint, marginal, and conditional probabilities. Columns 4 and 5, which represent 
the marginal effect on the probability of having a performing project or a project with 
satisfactory quality at entry, respectively, are the sum of columns 1 and 2, and 1 and 3, 
respectively.
22 Column 6 gives marginal effects on the probability that the project’s 
outcome will be satisfactory conditional on having a good quality at entry. 
By far, the most powerful variable in determining success is the quality at entry of 
the project. A good quality project has a 25.8 percent higher probability of performing 
well during implementation than a poorly designed project. The fact that the bivariate 
estimate is substantially higher than the univariate estimate (17.5 percent) hints to a 
causal relationship between quality and performance. There is thus more than a mere 
statistical association between these variables; their association ought to be structural. A 
quick comparison between the marginal effects predicted by the single equation model 
and this recursive one shows that except for quality at entry, all marginal effects are 
similar in importance across the models. The borrower’s quality of implementation, and 
supervision by the Bank also have an important impact on project performance, but this 
impact is slightly reduced with respect to the single probit model. The borrower’s 
involvement during the preparation stage of the project has a tremendous impact on the 
quality at entry with the marginal impact of 48 percent, as in the probit case. The 
effectiveness of the government is the second most important variable in explaining the 
quality at entry of projects. As in the single equation model, a marginal increase in 
effectiveness increases the probability of having a good quality project by 20.5 percent. 
An additional piece of ESW increases by 2.7 percent the chances for high quality projects 
in the future. A marginal improvement in the government’s accountability or the 
country’s regulatory environment would decrease the probability of satisfactory quality 
for the project by 5 and 13 percent, respectively. 
Coming to joint probabilities, better supervision decrease the probability of failure 
of a satisfactory quality project by 13.3 percent and at the same time it increases the 
probability of success of a poorly designed project by 2.9 percent. As shown by Kilby 
(2000) but unlike Dollar and Svensson (2000), timely supervision is very important to 
                                                 
22 This is simply Prob(x =1) = Prob(x = 1, y = 0)+Prob(x = 1, y = 1) where the last two terms are the joint 
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keep good projects on track, and it might help salvage badly designed projects, although 
it is much less effective in this respect. The quality of implementation has the same 
impact on the marginal probabilities as supervision, but with a higher intensity. 
Interestingly, marginal improvements in the soundness of the regulatory environment 
increase the chances of a bad project ending up with a satisfactory rating by 13.4 percent, 
and significantly decreases the probability that a well-designed project fails by 6 percent. 
Africa has a 5.6 percent less chance for project success, but it also has a 6 percent lower 
probability of receiving a well-designed project. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper tackles the hotly debated issue of the quality of foreign aid. It 
empirically demonstrates that the quality of aid has a tremendous impact on its 
effectiveness. The paper also shows that design is an essential component of aid quality. 
The design of aid is an upstream process undertaken by aid agencies. Therefore, the role 
and impact of donors in determining the quality of the assistance they provide goes well 
beyond selectivity. Aid is not donor-neutral and its quality is not exclusively determined 
by the characteristics of its recipients. 
The paper establishes both theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is 
endogenous to the incentive system that prevails in the aid agency and the capacity and 
accountability of the recipient country. On the agency side, the higher the effort by the 
agency staff to design a project the better is its quality and probability of having a 
positive development impact. Recipient governments may, on one hand, have strong 
incentives to accept projects because projects bring personal benefits. On the other hand 
they might be deterred from welcoming bad projects if they are accountable “enough” to 
their citizenry in the event of project failure. On the agency side, unless there exists a 
minimum standard for project quality, the staff exert more effort on project design only 
when they are matched with a highly accountable perfect screener. When the incentive 
system in the agency leans toward a culture of “pushing money,” where only the number 
of accepted projects matters, then all low-capacity governments will receive poorly 
designed projects. High capacity governments with low accountability are in this instance 
willing to accept bad projects for their own benefit to the detriment of their population. 
Highly accountable and capable governments will refuse all bad aid projects. 
This confirms Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) celebrated result that “aid works in 
good environments only” but hides a serious endogeneity issue. In effect, it is the 
combination of perverse incentives on both sides, and the recipient’s lack of capacity and 
accountability that channels bad aid into bad environments. Aid agencies have the 
capacity to direct good aid even into bad environments by adopting an incentive system 
that only rewards good projects. 
This result has strong implications for the use of selectivity as a yardstick for 
allocating aid to recipient countries. Selectivity is becoming the cornerstone of foreign 24
assistance among many bilateral and multilateral donors. As a matter of fact, both IDA 
allocations and the recently developed aid strategy of the United States administration, 
the Millennium Challenge Account, are based on this paradigm. Selectivity is grounded 
on efficiency arguments. For aid to be effective, it should target countries able to translate 
a dollar of aid into economic growth or poverty reduction. There are potential large gains 
in targeting aid to appropriate countries as shown by Collier and Dollar (2002). However, 
the risks involved are also commensurate to those gains. Indeed, for a selective aid 
strategy, only countries that carry out good economic policies in a democratic 
environment are aid-deserving. However, plenty of evidence points to the existence of a 
high correlation between income per capita and “good” environments. A selective 
allocation of aid would thus exclude the poorest countries from the aid sphere, and it is 
exactly there that ‘good’ aid can have the greatest impact. Because donors can affect the 
quality of aid, they must select for both the countries they assist and the quality of the 
projects they finance. 
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Table 1: Governance Indicators by Region 
  
Africa 
















(SAR)  Full Sample
Governance Indicators 
Voice &
Accountability -0.53 -0.29 -0.03 0.40 -0.73 -0.53 -0.28 
Political  Stability -0.39 -0.01 0.07  0.02 -0.51 -0.31 -0.19 
Government
Effectiveness -0.59 -0.28 -0.21 -0.13 -0.18 -0.13 -0.25 
Regulatory  Quality -0.47 -0.44 -0.16 0.31 -0.26 -0.14 -0.19 
Rule  of  Law -0.60 -0.42 -0.21 -0.11 -0.11 -0.31 -0.29 
Control of
Corruption -0.56 -0.42 -0.26 -0.13 -0.25 -0.24 -0.31 
 
 
Table 2: Features of Successful and Unsuccessful Projects 
  Successful   Unsuccessful  
Country Governance Characteristics    
Average Voice and Accountability  –0.27  –0.4 
Average Political Stability  –0.25  –0.5 
Average Government Effectiveness  –0.23  –0.44 
Average Regulatory Quality  –0.09  –0.26 
Average Rule of Law   –0.31  –0.47 
Average Control of Corruption  –0.37  –0.52 
Project Characteristics    
Loan Size ($Million)  99.4  98.0 
Preparation Resources ($’000)  337  343 
Supervision Resources ($’000)  373  423 
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Number of Countries  42 15 29 30  9  7 132 
Number of Projects  491 265 281 319 125 216  1697 
Average Size of Projects  42.9 149.7  111.1  118.4 78.3 132.1 99.1 
Project Performance (%) 
Highly  Satisfactory  1.8 7.2  10.3  8.8 4.8 5.5 6.1 
Satisfactory  59.7 73.6 71.5 72.1 63.2 66.7 67.3 
Unsatisfactory  35.4 17.3 17.1 18.1 27.2 25.0 24.4 
Highly  Unsatisfactory  3.1 1.9 1.1 0.9 4.8 2.8 2.2 
Project Quality at Entry (%) 
Highly  Satisfactory  2.9 6.5  13.9  10.1 6.4 6.0 7.2 
Satisfactory  55.4 69.8 68.7 65.8 66.4 54.6 62.5 
Unsatisfactory  40.1 22.6 15.6 23.2 24.8 37.5 28.7 






Table 4: Correlation between Quality at Entry and Performance 
  Project Quality at Entry 
Project Performance  
Highly 
Unsatisfactory  Unsatisfactory Satisfactory  Highly  Satisfactory 
Highly Unsatisfactory  13  20  5 0 
Unsatisfactory  12  282  117 3 
Satisfactory  1 185  889  67 
Highly Satisfactory  0 0  50  53 
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Table 5: Project Performance and Quality Univariate Probit Regressions 
Regression No 
Number of Observations 






















  Project Performance  Project Quality at Entry 
Project Quality at Entry      0.735***  (0.108)     
      [0.175]     
Voice and Accountability  -0.089 (0.093)  -0.085 (0.075)  -0.033 (0.114)  -0.025 (0.116)  -0.092 (0.102)  -0.217*** (0.078)  -0.160** (0.081) 
  [-0.029] [-0.026] [-0.007] [-0.005] [-0.032] [-0.072] [-0.051] 
Political Stability  0.159** (0.077)  0.072 (0.081)  0.006 (0.093)  0.027 (0.100)  0.180** (0.088)  0.118 (0.078)  -0.007 (0.082) 
  [0.051] [0.022] [0.001] [0.006] [0.062] [0.039] [-0.002] 
Government Effectiveness  0.436** (0.177)  0.525*** (0.184)  0.399* (0.221)  0.227 (0.227)  0.471*** (0.163)  0.707*** (0.165)  0.650*** (0.179) 
  [0.141] [0.162] [0.084] [0.046] [0.163] [0.236] [0.205] 
Regulatory Quality  0.046 (0.162)  0.014 (0.169)  0.106 (0.203)  0.256 (0.209)  -0.204 (0.170)  -0.388** (0.154)  -0.431*** (0.154) 
  [0.015] [0.004] [0.022] [0.052]  [-0.070]  [-0.130]  [-0.136] 
Bank Quality of Supervision      0.981*** (0.097)  0.808*** (0.102)       
     [0.207]  [0.164]     
Borrower Quality of Implementation      1.401*** (0.121)  1.262*** (0.129)       
     [0.296]  [0.256]     
Borrower Quality of Compliance      0.404*** (0.110)  0.399*** (0.107)       
     [0.085]  [0.081]     
Borrower Quality of Preparation         1.531***  (0.105) 
         [0.484] 
ESW Deliveries at Project Entry        0.098***  (0.035)  0.089**  (0.040) 
        [0.033]  [0.028] 
Log of Loan Size ($ Millions)    -0.042 (0.051)  -0.039 (0.063)  -0.014 (0.067)    -0.089* (0.054)  -0.091 (0.060) 
    [-0.013] [-0.008] [-0.003]    [-0.030] [-0.029] 
Preparation Resources (% of Loan Size)    -0.067* (0.040)  -0.094** (0.044)  -0.091* (0.048)    -0.045 (0.036)  -0.057 (0.044) 
    [-0.021] [-0.020] [-0.018]    [-0.015] [-0.018] 
Cancelled Loan Amount (% of Loan Size)    -2.351*** (0.218)  -1.654*** (0.278)  -1.540*** (0.282)       
    [-0.724] [-0.350] [-0.312]       
IDA Loan    0.175* (0.103)  0.226* (0.134)  0.261* (0.143)    0.143 (0.112)  0.179* (0.108) 
    [0.054] [0.048] [0.053]    [0.048] [0.056] 
Adjustment Loan    0.021 (0.129)  -0.275* (0.160)  -0.382** (0.159)    0.400*** (0.137)  0.306** (0.150) 
   [0.006]  [-0.064]  [-0.090]  [0.121]  [0.089] 
Eighties    -0.323*** (0.090)  0.050 (0.110)  0.095 (0.118)    -0.356*** (0.106)  -0.275*** (0.105) 
   [-0.105]  [0.010]  [0.019]  [-0.125]  [-0.091] 
Africa    -0.482*** (0.108)  -0.280** (0.133)  -0.279* (0.153)    -0.261** (0.108)  -0.179 (0.127) 
    [-0.158] [-0.063] [-0.060]    [-0.090] [-0.058] 
Europe & Central Asia    0.135 (0.146)  0.069 (0.219)  -0.012 (0.242)    0.401*** (0.159)  0.383*** (0.147) 
   [0.040]  [0.014]  [-0.002]  [0.122]  [0.110] 
Latin America & Caribbean    0.109 (0.178)  0.069 (0.207)  -0.005 (0.230)    0.471*** (0.134)  0.423*** (0.147) 
   [0.033]  [0.014]  [-0.001]  [0.142]  [0.121] 
Constant  0.809*** (0.062)  1.491*** (0.274)  -5.975*** (0.513)  -5.701*** (0.562)  0.675*** (0.064)  0.923*** (0.268)  -3.487*** (0.415) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.03 0.16 0.55 0.57 0.02 0.08 0.27 
Log Likelihood  -941.45 -814.31 -441.58 -417.43 -1008.41 -943.13  -756.18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal Effects in Brackets and computed at means. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 30
Table 6: Project Performance and Quality (Recursive) Bivariate Probit Regressions 
Regression No 
Number of Observations 



















  Performance Quality Performance Quality Performance Quality Performance  Quality Performance Quality  Performance  Quality 
Project Quality at Entry                  1.329***  1.017***   
                 (0.169)  (0.181)   
Voice and Accountability  -0.100  -0.104  -0.132* -0.223*** -0.069  -0.168** -0.062 -0.163** 0.011  -0.158* -0.005  -0.158** 
  (0.091)  (0.102)  (0.069) (0.076) (0.098) (0.082) (0.108) (0.082) (0.106) (0.081)  (0.113)  (0.081) 
Political  Stability  0.161**  0.184**  0.106 0.121  0.080 -0.002 0.040 -0.004 0.043 -0.005  0.014  -0.007 
  (0.077)  (0.089)  (0.079) (0.080) (0.085) (0.083) (0.092) (0.083) (0.090) (0.081)  (0.098)  (0.081) 
Government Effectiveness  0.440**  0.472*** 0.547***  0.697*** 0.224 0.676***  0.383*  0.662***  -0.033 0.642***  0.168  0.648*** 
  (0.174)  (0.158)  (0.189) (0.161) (0.199) (0.180) (0.221) (0.180) (0.206) (0.177)  (0.228)  (0.178) 
Regulatory Quality  0.065  -0.202  0.016  -0.375**  0.194  -0.439*** 0.141  -0.434*** 0.369*  -0.430***  0.282  -0.433*** 
  (0.164)  (0.172)  (0.168) (0.154) (0.193) (0.155) (0.201) (0.154) (0.201) (0.154)  (0.209)  (0.154) 
Bank Quality of Supervision              0.864***       0.789***   
             (0.098)       (0.100)   
Borrower Quality of Implementation          1.483***    1.340***    1.312***  1.209***   
         (0.115)    (0.121)    (0.130)  (0.135)   
Borrower Quality of Compliance          0.452***    0.382***    0.470***  0.399***   
         (0.092)    (0.105)    (0.095)  (0.105)   
Borrower Quality of Preparation           1.426***  1.477***  1.533***    1.533*** 
           (0.101)  (0.102)  (0.105)    (0.105) 
ESW Deliveries at Project Entry        0.085***  0.090**  0.092**  0.085**    0.086** 
       (0.026)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.041)   (0.040) 
Log of Loan Size ($ Millions)      -0.045  -0.091*  0.013  -0.094 -0.033 -0.092 0.047 -0.090 -0.007  -0.091 
      (0.054) (0.052) (0.065) (0.060) (0.064) (0.060) (0.068) (0.060)  (0.067)  (0.060) 
Preparation Resources (% of Loan Size)      -0.082* -0.051 -0.119*** -0.056 -0.099** -0.056 -0.107** -0.057  -0.084*  -0.058 
      (0.042) (0.035) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)  (0.048)  (0.044) 
Supervision Resources (% of Loan Size)     0.015    0.045        0.052      
     (0.025)    (0.038)        (0.039)      
Cancelled Loan Amount ( % of Size)      -1.519***    -1.362***    -1.548***    -1.345***  -1.521***   
     (0.203)    (0.255)    (0.272)    (0.267)  (0.279)   
IDA  Loan      0.240** 0.141 0.302** 0.171 0.258* 0.174 0.282* 0.183* 0.250*  0.182* 
      (0.105) (0.110) (0.136) (0.107) (0.134) (0.107) (0.146) (0.108)  (0.143)  (0.108) 
Adjustment Loan      0.086  0.407***  -0.105  0.305**  -0.275* 0.303** -0.296* 0.314** -0.410**  0.311** 
      (0.124) (0.132) (0.156) (0.149) (0.158) (0.150) (0.160) (0.150)  (0.162)  (0.150) 
Eighties     -0.313***  -0.364*** -0.034  -0.292*** 0.023  -0.283*** 0.115  -0.267**  0.125  -0.271** 
      (0.085) (0.105) (0.098) (0.105) (0.110) (0.105) (0.111) (0.105)  (0.121)  (0.105) 
Africa      -0.475***  -0.251**  -0.359*** -0.175 -0.306** -0.173 -0.295*  -0.187  -0.257*  -0.184 
      (0.105) (0.108) (0.132) (0.128) (0.137) (0.128) (0.154) (0.127)  (0.153)  (0.127) 
Europe & Central Asia      0.137  0.396**  0.063  0.383*** 0.073 0.381*** -0.099 0.388*** -0.043  0.386*** 
      (0.141) (0.156) (0.213) (0.146) (0.220) (0.146) (0.245) (0.148)  (0.245)  (0.148) 
Latin America & Caribbean      0.173  0.459***  0.137  0.431*** 0.084 0.426*** -0.039 0.423*** -0.039  0.424*** 
      (0.180) (0.128) (0.211) (0.147) (0.211) (0.147) (0.232) (0.145)  (0.229)  (0.146) 
Constant 0.813***  0.674*** 1.331***  0.937***  -3.969*** -3.165*** -5.456*** -3.324*** -4.590*** -3.501*** -5.755*** -3.494*** 
  (0.062)  (0.063)  (0.294) (0.261) (0.434) (0.400) (0.544) (0.405) (0.477) (0.413)  (0.563)  (0.414) 
Correlation Coefficient (ρ)  0.78***    0.73***  0.42***  0.32***  -0.26**   -0.20*   
  (0.024)    (0.031)  (0.054)  (0.058)  (0.105)  (0.111)   
Log Likelihood  -1716.38    -1590.53    -1228.11  -1184.16  -1205.13   -1172.38   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 31
Table 7: Marginal Effects of Project Performance and Quality (Recursive) Bivariate Probit Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





 qae=1)  Prob(perf=1) Prob(qae=1) Prob(perf=1| qae=1) 
Project Quality at Entry  0.208*** 0.049*** -0.208*** 0.258*** (no  effect) 0.276*** 
  (0.056) (0.008) (0.057) (0.062)    (0.075) 
Voice and Accountability  -0.046 0.045* -0.004 -0.001 -0.050** -0.004 
  (0.029) (0.023)  (0.02)  (0.024) (0.025)  (0.026) 
Political Stability  0.0005 0.0024 -0.002  0.003  -0.002  0.003 
  (0.027) (0.023) (0.018) (0.022) (0.024)  (0.024) 
Government Effectiveness  0.214*** -0.178***  -0.009 0.034  0.205*** 0.05 
  (0.060) (0.051) (0.039) (0.047) (0.058)  (0.05) 
Regulatory Quality  -0.076 0.134*** -0.061*  0.058 -0.137*** 0.055 
  (0.053) (0.043) (0.031) (0.038) (0.047)  (0.04) 
Bank Quality of Supervision  0.136*** 0.0289*** -0.133*** 0.162*** (no  effect) 0.178*** 
  (0.020) (0.008) (0.019) (0.022)    (0.026) 
Borrower Quality of Implementation  0.205*** 0.044*** -0.205*** 0.249*** (no  effect) 0.272*** 
  (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.024)    (0.026) 
Borrower Quality of Compliance  0.068*** 0.015*** -0.067*** 0.082*** (no  effect) 0.089*** 
  (0.018) (0.005) (0.018) (0.021)    (0.023) 
Borrower Quality of Preparation  0.439*** -0.439*** 0.046*** (no effect)  0.485***  0.029 
  (0.030) (0.030)  (0.01)    (0.032)  (0.018) 
ESW Deliveries at Project Entry  0.025** -0.025**  0.0026**  (no  effect)  0.027**  0.0016 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.001)    (0.011) (0.0012) 
Log of Loan Size ($ Millions)  -0.027* 0.026* -0.001 -0.001 -0.029*  -0.003 
  (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015)  (0.014) 
Preparation Resources (% of Loan Size)  -0.031** 0.013  0.012 -0.017* -0.018  -0.02* 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.008)  (0.01)  (0.013)  (0.011) 
Cancelled Loan Amount ( % of Size)  -0.257*** -0.056*** 0.257*** -0.313*** (no  effect) -0.342*** 
  (0.047) (0.016) (0.047) (0.054)    (0.062) 
IDA Loan  0.094*** -0.043  -0.036  0.051* 0.057* 0.0594* 
  (0.033) (0.029) (0.023) (0.028)  (0.03)  (0.031) 
Adjustment Loan  -0.0036 -0.095*** 0.094**  -0.098**  0.091**  -0.099** 
  (0.046) (0.032) (0.038) (0.042) (0.037)  (0.045) 
Eighties  -0.062** 0.086***  -0.028  0.025 -0.09*** 0.022 
  (0.031) (0.029) (0.019) (0.023)  (0.03)  (0.026) 
Africa  -0.099** 0.0425  0.039  -0.056*  -0.06*  -0.065* 
  (0.04) (0.034)  (0.027)  (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) 
Europe & Central Asia  0.093** -0.102***  0.018  -0.009 0.11*** -0.003 
  (0.045) (0.032) (0.035) (0.039) (0.035)  (0.041) 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.103** -0.111***  0.018  -0.008 0.122*** -0.001 
  (0.044) (0.032) (0.033) (0.038) (0.034)  (0.04) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Fig. 1: High Capacity Government 
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Fig. 2: Low Capacity Government 
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